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1. INTRODUCTION
On 4 April 2019, the new Belgian Code of Companies and
Associations (BCCA) of 23 March 2019 was published in the
Official Gazette. It entered into force on 1 May 2019.1 This
contribution2 provides in an overview of the new structure of the
Code and the basic concepts as well as the important changes that
apply to all legal entities. This includes, among other things, the
limitation of directors’ liability and the transition from the real seat
towards the statutory seat. The third section studies the new private
limited liability company, the BV, for which the capital requirement
has been abolished. Subsequently, sections 4 to 6 discuss the changes
that apply to (the issuance of) shares and other securities, the
management, and the dissolution and liquidation of the company.
In the last section, the rules of entering into force and a short
conclusion is provided.
2. STRUCTURE OF THE CODE AND MAIN CONCEPTS
The BCCA is divided in five parts, and further subdivided in
different books. The first part, from book 1 to book 3, contains the
general provisions that apply to companies, associations and foun-
dations. Part 2 contains provisions specifically applicable to the
different types of companies. Part 3 continues with the provisions
that apply to associations and foundations. Part 4 deals with the
restructuring and the transformation of the legal form and the last
Part 5 contains provisions on the European legal forms.
The existing list of different types of companies is significantly
shortened. The remaining company forms, and in particular the
private company, offer flexibility and should guarantee that in their
articles of association the specific features of the abolished company
forms can be incorporated. In addition to the European legal forms,
the SE, the SCE and the EEIG, there are essentially four basic
remaining forms of companies: the partnership, the private com-
pany (BV), the public limited company (NV) and the cooperative
company (CV).
The BCCA starts with a new definition of the term ‘company’.
The definition reads: ‘A company is established by a legal act of
one or more persons, called partners, who make a contribution. It
has equity and must develop one or more specific activities. One of
her goals is to provide, either directly or indirectly, an equity gain
for her partners’.3 This new definition clarifies that a company
can be established by one person, who can either be a natural or
a legal person. There remain exceptions as a partnership pre-
supposes at least two parties and a cooperative company requires
three founders, in compliance with the cooperative ideology.
These two exceptions lead to the finding that the sole founder is
only applicable in case a private or a public limited liability
company is established. Nevertheless, this change is particularly
welcome for groups of companies, which formerly artificially had
two or more shareholders for each company in their group of
companies.
Second, the definition states that partners provide in a contri-
bution (in cash or in kind). However, the minimum capital
requirement has been abolished for private companies. Third, the
company must have as one of its goals the provision of gains for the
partners. This criterion is essential to distinguish companies from
associations in the Belgian law. Associations can make profit but
cannot distribute the benefits (in)directly to the members of the
association. The term ‘indirect benefit’ is defined as ‘any transaction
that causes the assets of an association or foundation to decrease or its
liabilities to increase and for which it either receives no consideration
or only a consideration that is apparently too low in relation to the
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value of its performance delivered’.4 A classic example was the lease
agreement in which the association, as a tenant, rents a building
from one of its members for a rent that is higher than the market
rent. Fourth, the outdated distinction in commercial and civil
activities, like those of attorneys-at-law, resulting in commercial and
civil companies, is abrogated.
The cooperative company can only be used in special circum-
stances. Article 350 BCCA defines the cooperative society as ‘the
company that is composed of a variable number of partners providing
in a variable contribution’ and the company’s main purpose must be
the meeting of any kind of needs of the shareholders. Formerly, the
flexible entry and exit arrangements, together with a number of other
flexible options (including multiple voting rights), made this form of
company attractive, not only for companies in the traditional coop-
erative sector, but also for other sectors, such as the so called liberal
professions like accountants, auditors, attorneys-at-law etc. The
BCCA wants to put an end to this ‘improper’ use of this company
form adding the requirement of meeting a need of the shareholders.
The question arises what this new obligation effectively adds.
However, the legislator considers this purpose pivotal: the coopera-
tive company can even be dissolved in the event of non-compliance.5
3. COMMON PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE ON ALL LEGAL ENTITIES
3.1. Modern Communication Tools
The BCCA guides the Belgian company partially in the twenty-first
century allowing the use of modern communication tools. The
BCCA introduces the option for a legal person to include an
official email address and an official website in its articles of
association. Shareholders, members or holders of securities in the
company can write to the legal person at this e-mail address and
may thereby assume that the legal person has received their mes-
sage. On the other hand, shareholders or members and other
corporate incumbents of the legal entity (such as directors) can
provide their e-mail address, and request that all communication
takes place via this e-mail address. The BCCA also allows that the
official website of a legal entity can be used for the disclosure of
certain types of information.
3.2. Permanent Representation of a Legal Entity
Article 61, §2 of the former Belgian Company Code provided in an
obligation for legal persons to appoint a permanent representative-
natural person if they have been appointed as a director, manager or
member of the management committee, of the management board
or of the supervisory board in a company.6 That designated natural
person was charged with the execution of the mandate in the name
and for the account of the legal person. This representation system
is largely copied in the BCCA and its field of application is broa-
dened to all legal entities, and from now on also applies to non-
executive directors of the not for profit organizations and the
foundation. The permanent representative-natural person is subject
to the same conditions as the director-legal person and jointly and
severally liable as if she had carried out the relevant mandate in her
own name and for her own account. It can be qualified as the
principle of transparency of the director-legal person. From this
principle can be derived, for example, that the permanent repre-
sentative must meet the requirements of independence, if the legal
entity is qualified as independent director.
3.3. Directors’ Liability and the Circle of Liable Persons
The BCCA includes a general liability rule for mistakes committed
in the exercise of the function of a director, which essentially is
inspired by the former articles 527 and 528 of the Companies Code.
The BCCA states that directors, managers, daily directors, members
of management boards or supervisory boards are only liable ‘for
decisions, actions or behavior that are apparently outside the margin
within which normally prudent and careful directors, placed in the
same circumstances, could reasonably disagree’. It is obvious that this
liability rule will give rise to a great deal of discussion in particular
regarding the meaning of what is ‘apparently outside the margin’ of
normal practice.7
The liability does not only apply to all members of the governing
bodies, including the daily director but also, according to article 2:56
BCCA to de facto directors, which are those persons of which it is
shown that they have governing power with regard to the legal
person.
3.4. Individual versus Joint and Several Liability
The BCCA also clarifies the issue of the individual versus joint and
several liability of directors in the hypothesis in which the legal
person has several directors. In this context, a distinction is made
whether the governing body constitutes a college:
– If the governing body is a college, the members are jointly and
severally liable for the decisions and or shortcomings. It does
not matter whether the mistake consists of a normal manage-
ment error or an infringement of the company code or the
articles of association. In all cases, the liability for the members
of the college is jointly and severally.
– If the administrative body does not constitute a college, then
each director is only liable insofar as she can be blamed for an
4 Article 1:4 BCCA.
5 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill introducing the Code of Companies and Associations and containing various provisions, Parl. St. Kamer 2017–18, no. 3119/1, 15.
6 H. Braeckmans & R. Houben, Handboek Vennootschapsrecht, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 375–381 (2012) (met verdere verwijzingen); M. Wauters, De bestuurder-rechtspersoon en
zijn vaste vertegenwoordiger, in Nieuw vennootschapsrecht 2002-De wet corporate governance 13–105 (Kalmthout, Biblo 2003).
7 As it is the case in the Netherlands. See e.g. B. Assink, Compendium Ondernemingsrecht 1052–1093 (Deventer: Kluwer 2013).
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error. However, if the error consists in the violation of a provi-
sion of the BCCA or the articles of association, the members of
the administrative body are jointly and severally liable for all
damage resulting from this infringement.
In case there is a reason for joint and several liability, a director can
be excluded from that liability. This requires, first of all, that she did
not personally participate in the mistake (for example because she
was legitimately absent from the meeting that took the relevant
decision). Next, the director must have reported the alleged error to
the other directors.
3.5. Limitation of the Maximum Director’s Liability
A, at first glance, important innovation is the limitation of the
amount for which a director can be held liable. As far as I know, this
limitation is relatively unique in the world of directors’ liabilities.
The limitation of liability is provided for each (daily) director,
manager, member of the management board or supervisory board
and applies in principle to all different types of liability, whether it
relates to third parties or the company and whether it is of a
contractual or extra-contractual nature.
The maximum director’s liability depends on the size of the
controlled legal entity, which is determined in function of the
turnover and the balance sheet total of that legal entity.8 The larger
the controlled legal entity is, the larger the potential liability of the
director must be. However, there is no explanation as to why these
thresholds have been chosen. The thresholds are as follows:
– EUR 125,000 for directors of legal entities who have an average
turnover of less than (indexed) EUR 350,000 (excluding VAT)
in the three previous financial years and whose average balance
sheet over the same period did not exceed (indexed) EUR
175,000;
– EUR 250,000 for directors of legal entities outside the scope of
the first class and with an average turnover of less than
(indexed) EUR 700,000 (excluding VAT) and whose average
balance sheet over the same period was not higher than
(indexed) EUR 350,000;
– EUR 1,000,000 for directors of legal entities outside the scope of
the first two classes and that do not exceed more than one of
the following criteria in the three previous financial years: (1)
an average annual turnover (excluding VAT) of (indexed) EUR
9,000,000 and (2) an average balance sheet total of (indexed)
EUR 4,500,000;
– EUR 3 million for directors of legal entities outside the scope of
the first three classes and which are not exceeding the criteria of
the next class; and
– EUR 12,000,000 for directors of public interest entities and legal
entities that in any of the three financial years exceed: (1) an
average balance sheet total of (indexed) EUR 43,000,000, and
(2) an average annual turnover (excluding VAT) of (indexed)
EUR 50,000,000.
The above maximum amounts apply to all directors jointly.
Therefore, if several directors are held liable for the same mistake,
they will mutually benefit from the liability limitation. Moreover,
the maximum amounts apply per fact or the whole of facts that can
give rise to liability, regardless of the number of claimants or claims.
If there are several claimants who jointly or separately institute a
claim for liability for the same fact, the aforementioned limitation of
liability is applied.
The limitation of the liability is subject to a number of (impor-
tant) exceptions, in which case the director is liable for all the
damages. The most important exceptions are mistakes that usually
occurred rather than accidentally, the serious error, the fraudulent
intent or with the intention to harm, late or no payment of taxes,
late or no payment of social security payments and the like.9
The exceptions lead to the finding that the limitation of direc-
tor’s liability is in many cases symbolic. This applies in particular to
the exception in the case of (1) the minor error that usually occurs
rather than accidentally and (2) the serious error. These concepts
are inspired by the Belgian liability rules of employees but in the
context of the management of companies must be considered less
appropriate. As discussed, directors can only be held liable if they
have committed an error that would not have been committed by
normally prudent and careful directors placed in the same circum-
stances. The concept of the ‘marginal review’ of which courts will
make use of for assessing the liability of directors, thus essentially
implies a certain degree of gravity of the error, meaning that in
many circumstances the mistake must be considered a ‘serious
error’ to give rise to any kind of directors’ liability. It necessarily
means that the limitation of liability is excluded. Accordingly, the
repeated minor error will be assessed.
Any kind of contractual limitation of director’s liability is to be
considered null and void. The prohibition results in the non-per-
missibility of so-called ‘hold harmless’ arrangements that currently
exist, mainly in listed companies. However, it remains permitted
that the legal entity insures its directors at its expense. The insur-
ance does not deprive shareholders or third parties of their option to
receive financial compensation in the event of management errors.
3.6. International Company Law
The BCCA abandons the current ‘real seat theory’ and refers to the
location of the registered office of companies in order to determine
the applicable national company law. Moreover, shareholders of the
company can, by means of an amendment of the articles of asso-
ciation which requires a supermajority vote of 80%, relocate the
8 Article 2:57 BCCA.
9 See for the full list of exceptions Art. 2:57, §2 BCCA.
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registered office, and consequently the company’s applicable
national company law. If this decision is taken, it is also required
that the interests of the creditors are taken into account. The
creditors of a ‘moving company’ are given the opportunity of
demanding specific guarantees and securities similarly to those
requests known in the context of the capital reduction. Thus, the
Belgian international private law regime for companies is in line
with the case law of the Court of Justice with regard to the freedom
of establishment.
It must be noted that this freedom of choice has no spill-over
effect on the other areas of law. For example, tax law and insolvency
law consider the location of the real seat to determine the applicable
law. The same applies to, among other things, social law (place of
employment) and environmental law (location of the factory). The
freedom of choice only relates to the company’s organizational law:
how is the company founded and dissolved, how is it represented in
legal transactions, what organizational law measures should it take
to protect stakeholders such as creditors.
4. THE EQUITY PRIVATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
4.1. From Capital to Equity
As stated above, the BV is at the centre of the Belgian corporate law
reform. The Belgian legislator abolished the concept of ‘capital’ for
this type of company. ‘Capital’ in the corporate law sense is essen-
tially the amount, which can be found on the liabilities side of the
balance sheet, which indicates which part of the company’s assets is
not eligible for distribution, except through a capital reduction
procedure. The minimum capital obligation must ensure that the
security buffer for creditors has a certain minimum size. However,
the final impact on creditors is negligible, since the amounts of the
minimum capital are particularly limited, the capital offers no
protection against corporate losses and the threshold does not pre-
vent fraudulent start-ups.
From 1 May 2019, the BV must have, instead of a minimum
capital, sufficient initial equity to realize the planned activities over a
period of two years. Subordinated funds (credits) that are made
available to the company by the founders may also be taken into
account for the assessment of the availability of sufficient equity.
The founders must establish a financial plan that shows that the
activities can be financed with the contributions. More precisely, the
financial plan must contain: (1) a precise description of the pro-
posed activity, (2) an overview of all sources of financing at incor-
poration date, including the securities provided in that regard, (3),
an opening balance sheet and a projected balance sheet after twelve
and twenty-four months, (4) a projected income statement after
twelve and twenty-four months, (5) a budget of the expected income
and expenditure for a period of at least two years after its estab-
lishment, and (6) a description of the assumptions used in esti-
mating expected sales and profitability. Experts can help the
founders with the establishment of the financial plan but assistance
is not mandatory. In case an external expert is involved, the finan-
cial plan must identify the consultant. The mandatory duty to
establish a financial plan already existed in Belgium since the late
1970s, but, with one exception,10 the founders of the company were
free to decide what kind of information they included in this plan.
As of now, the prescribed content of the financial plan is also
applicable in case the founders establish a public limited liability
company. The financial plan must not be made public and must
only be kept by the notary who has assisted in the establishment of
the company. The content of the financial plan will only play a role
if the company is declared bankrupt within three years after its
incorporation. The court may hold the founders liable for part or all
of the company’s net liability if it comes to the conclusion that the
initial equity of the company at its incorporation was manifestly
insufficient for the normal exercise of the intended activity in
respect of least two years.
There seems to be a Belgian consensus that the financial plan is a
useful tool to combat frivolous establishments, even though no or
hardly any other countries have adopted this approach. The ques-
tion arises, however, whether this substantial increase in substantive
requirements of the financial plan, which in effect increases the
costs of incorporation, does not exceed the benefits of the expected
decline in the number of frivolous establishments.
While the notion of capital is abolished, the rules of contribution
to the company by the founders remain practically unchanged.
Contributions in kind must in principle be valued and checked, and
cash contributions must be deposited into a account opened in the
name of the company. What does change is the contribution of
future services in the BV (but not in the NV). As of now, it is
allowed to contribute future services to the company and be com-
pensated in shares. Furthermore, the so-called rules on quasi-
contribution11 are abolished for the BV. It is assumed that the
procedure for the settlement of conflicts of interest entails sufficient
guarantees for the creditors of the BV. These relaxations are not
possible for the NV, due to the European Company Directives.
4.2. Distributions to the Shareholders
The abolishment of the capital rules for the BV has a significant
impact on the profit distribution rules. Any distribution must be
submitted to two tests: a balance sheet test and a liquidity test. These
tests are being applied not only to the payment of dividends, but
also in the context of the repayment of contributions (the former
10 Since 2010, for a specific kind of private limited liability company, a financial plan with a similar content had to be prepared by the founders.
11 When a founder or shareholder within the first two years of establishment of the company transfers any asset to the company for an amount which is higher than 10% of the
capital, a specific procedure had to be applied (former Arts 220 to 222 Companies Act).
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capital reduction), the purchase of treasury shares and the provision
of financial assistance. The distribution restrictions must also be
applied to the payment of an exit in the new exit procedure.
4.2.1. Direct Distribution of Assets
In light of the abolition of the capital concept, both transactions,
profit distribution and return of contributions are regulated in the
same way in the BCCA for the BV. The return of contributions no
longer implies an amendment to the articles of association, whereby
creditors enjoy a right to object, but it is considered a mere dis-
tribution of assets that can be implemented if the balance sheet test
and the liquidity test are met.
Only if the balance sheet test (to be carried out by the general
meeting) and the liquidity test (to be carried out by the management
body) are passed simultaneously, the BV can continue with the
distribution. Important to note is that even if the general meeting
decides to make a distribution within the limits of the balance sheet
test, a separate, autonomous responsibility lies with the manage-
ment body to check whether the distribution proposed by the
shareholders may take place on the basis of an investigation if, after
the distribution, the company will reasonably be able to continue to
pay its debts as they expire, which is primarily a question of
liquidity.
The balance sheet test is very similar to the current net asset test.
No payment may be made if the shareholders’ equity of the com-
pany is negative or if the payment would make it negative. An
important innovation in this regard is the power to distribute profit
of the current financial year. One has no longer to wait until six
months have passed since the end of the previous financial year and
there is no minimum period of three months to pass between each
interim dividend.12 These relaxations also apply to the NV.
The balance sheet test is inextricably linked to the second test,
the so-called ‘liquidity test’. The BCCA stipulates that the deci-
sion of the general meeting to distribute profit within the fra-
mework of the balance sheet test will only take effect after the
management body has established that after the distribution the
company will continue to be able to pay its debts as they become
due and payable on a period of at least twelve months from the
date of payment. The twelve-month period is a minimum period,
which incidentally coincides with the timeframe that the board
must already take into account when testing the continuity
hypothesis. Since this is a minimum period, the board must in
any case also take into account the events of which it is already
aware and which can have a significant impact on the liquidity
position of the company in the future. One can think of the
expiry date of a major loan that takes place eighteen months after
the payment is made.
The decision of the governing body in the context of the liquidity
test is justified in a report that must not be made public and neither
is a sanctioning system provided. The purpose of this report is
threefold: (1) it encourages the management body to exercise due
diligence in conducting the liquidity test, (2) it allows lenders to
ensure that the liquidity is not jeopardized and (3) it gives the
management body the opportunity to compile evidence in case the
legal validity of the distribution is subsequently challenged.
No legal obligations are imposed on the content of the board’s
report. The concrete tests that are carried out are left to the dis-
cretion of the governing body. In companies with a sufficiently high
liquidity, the liquidity test can be simple. A simple comparison
between the current assets of the company less inventories and
short-term debts can suffice. The less liquidity there is in the
company, the more diligent the directors must be and the more
elaborated their cash flow analysis must be. The BCCA does require
that in the companies in which an external auditor has been
appointed, the latter must control the accounting and financial data
of the board’s report, but she has no duty to provide in a judgment
of the (adequacy of the) liquidity test.
At first glance, there may be the impression that the liquidity test
is an important novelty in the BCCA. However, such a test has long
been formally part of the law of Anglo-American legal culture, and
is actually nothing new in Belgium either: based on the general duty
of care and the general contractual governing duty, the governing
body had to assess the distributions in light of the assets of the
company.13 The scope of the new legislation is, however, limited to
BV, as a compensatory measure for the abolition of capital. Only the
management body of the BV has the legal obligation to elaborate the
liquidity test in a management report.
An important innovation of the BCCA relates to the right of the
BV to reclaim a distribution that was executed contrary to the
balance sheet or liquidity test, even if those shareholders are acting
in good faith. The latter is conceptually a fundamental change to the
old company law, which required bad faith of the shareholders.14 In
practice, however, the difference is limited, since in private limited
companies the beneficiary shareholders often know the nature of the
distribution (and as a major shareholder or director are directly
involved). Furthermore, the directors who have made a payment in
violation of the liquidity test are liable to the company and third
parties for all damages if it is established that they knew (bad faith)
or should have known in light of the circumstances when taking the
decision to make a distribution.
4.2.2. Indirect Distribution of Assets
The balance sheet test and the liquidity test also have their effect in
the context of the indirect distributions of company assets, and
12 For an assessment of the former system see N. Cooremen and updated by S. Claeys, Commentaar bij artikel 618 W.Venn, in Duiding Vennootschappen 2017, 1003–1006 (D.
Bruloot, K. Byttebier, J. Cerfontaine, H. De Wulf & K. Maresceau eds, Brussel: Larcier 2017).
13 R. Tas, Winstuitkering, kapitaalvermindering en -verlies in NV en BVBA 296–297 (Kalmthout: Biblo 2003).
14 The bad faith requirement is still applicable in the NV in accordance with Art. 18 of Directive 2012/30/EU.
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more specifically with regard to the purchase of treasury shares,
financial assistance and the exit of shareholders. After all, each of
these transactions has the effect of transferring assets from the
company to the shareholders (or threatening to take place in the
event of financial assistance).
The acquisition of treasury shares is adjusted given the
abolishment of the capital concept. The entire process regarding
the purchase of treasury shares has been simplified, but it
remains largely in line with the provisions of the old company
law. Among other things, the following conditions must be met:
(1) the amount allocated to the acquisition must be eligible for
payment (referring to the balance sheet test and the liquidity
test), (2) the transaction may only relate to fully paid-up shares,
(3) the principle of equal treatment of all shareholders must
be considered, unless it is unanimously decided differently and
(4) unavailable reserves must be established for the amount
allocated for the distribution, as long as the company keeps the
repurchased shares in portfolio.
Innovative in this BCCA acquisition procedure is the abolition
of the rule that only 20% of the shares (or capital) may be
purchased, a change that the BCCA also provides for the NV.
The only limitation in this regard concerns the financing capa-
cities of the company.
To protect the interests of creditors, the BCCA retains the
financial assistance scheme: in principle, it is permitted to provide
financial assistance to the person who wishes to take over the
company or otherwise wishes to acquire shares of the company. The
criteria that this financial assistance must meet remain essentially
the same. The most important limitation is that the transaction may
only be carried out with eligible funds, to be determined via the
balance sheet test and the liquidity test.
The limitation of pledging of own shares has been deleted, in
view of its ineffectiveness, so that the pledging of own shares is only
subject to the conflict of interest rules and the financial assistance
rules.
4.2.3. Corporate Exit
Where an exit of a shareholder charged to the equity of the
company under the old corporate law was only possible in the
cooperative company, within the limits of the variable capital, the
new BCCA provides in this facility for the shareholders of the BV
if and insofar as the statutes of the BV provides this attractive
option. This exit can also serve as an alternative to the dispute
resolution for which the intervention of the court is required.
The articles of association of the BV can freely determine the
modalities of the exit of the shareholder. In the absence of other
provisions in the articles of association, the supplementary
arrangement scheme will be applicable: (1) shareholders can only
exit during the first six months of the financial year, (2) all of the
shares of the shareholder must be cancelled, (3) the exit only takes
effect on the last day of the sixth month of the financial year and (4)
the exit must be paid no later than one month thereafter. Regarding
the value of the shares, the BCCA starts from the basic principle that
the value of the share is equal to the amount of the paid-up con-
tribution, with a maximum of the net asset value of the shares that
follows from the last approved annual accounts.
Since the payment comes from the corporate assets, the BCCA
also prescribes that the exit is only permitted to the extent that the
aforementioned balance sheet test and liquidity test are applied. If
the company has insufficient equity available for the payment, the
payment will be suspended. The postponed payment must be exe-
cuted before any other payment to the remaining shareholders is
taken place. The shares that the company acquired must be can-
celled. Since the cancellation of shares always implies an amend-
ment of the articles of association, the exit and the resulting
amendments to the articles of association must be passed by
authentic deed. This does not require a decision of the general
meeting, but a mere adoption by the governing body in front of the
notary. With this deed of adoption, however, the governing body
can wait until the end of the financial year, in order to have all exits
combined in one deed. The aim is to reduce the costs for companies
in the event that several exits takes place during one financial year.
In addition to the exit, the articles of association of a BV may
also freely determine that the company may exclude a shareholder
for a legal reason or for another reason stated in the articles of
association. The procedure is based on the former regulation of the
exclusion of a shareholder from a cooperative company.
In a nutshell, it boils down to the following. Only the general
meeting of shareholders is authorized to take the decision of an
exclusion. Thereto, the reasoned proposal for exclusion must be
communicated to the relevant shareholder, who has the right to
submit its comments in writing to the general meeting within a
period of one month after the announcement. If the shareholder so
requests, she must be heard by the general meeting. If the general
meeting decides to exclude the shareholder, it must give reasons for
its decision. This decision must be communicated to the disqualified
shareholder within fifteen days after the decision of the general
meeting. Unless the articles of association provide otherwise, the
excluded shareholder is entitled to the payment of the value of the
shares as determined in the BCCA. It should be noted that an
exclusion can also be requested during the first two years after
incorporation.
Finally, the BCCA provides for an optional scheme for a ‘legal’
exclusion. More specifically, the articles of association of a BV may
stipulate that in the event of death, bankruptcy, apparent inability,
liquidation or declaration of incapacity, a shareholder is deemed to
leave the company. In such a case, the shareholder or, if applicable,
its heirs, creditors or representatives are entitled to a payment of the
value of the shares, which is calculated in the same way as with the
ordinary withdrawal from the corporate equity.
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4.2.4. Loss of Equity
The abolishment of the notion of ‘capital’ has not only conse-
quences in the context of the (direct and indirect) distributions of
corporate assets. The disappearance of this notion also requires a
different interpretation of the so-called loss of capital procedure for
the BV. Where the former rules of articles 332 and 333 of the
Companies Code made use of the share capital to determine the
thresholds for starting the loss of capital procedure, the BCCA
relates financial difficulties to the balance sheet test and the liquidity
test to determine whether the governing body must convene the
general meeting to deliberate on the company’s future. More spe-
cifically, the management body must convene the general meeting
of shareholders after it has established, or should have established,
that the net assets are likely to become or have become negative
(balance sheet test). This convocation of the meeting is also man-
datory if the management body determines that it is no longer
certain that, in line with developments that can reasonably be
expected, the company will be able to pay its debts as they become
due in the next twelve months (liquidity test).
In addition to these redefined thresholds, the loss of equity
procedure is more or less similar in terms of content to the former
loss of capital procedure.15 For example, the management body
must prepare a special report and the general meeting must be given
the opportunity to deliberate and decide on the dissolution of the
company or on the measures announced in the agenda to safeguard
the continuity of the company. In the event of a violation of the
rules, the governing body can be held liable, whereby a rebuttable
presumption of causality is assumed.
Finally, third parties lose the right to start a procedure for the
dissolution of the company for loss of capital, which was available in
the former Companies Code (article 333).
5. SHARES AND OTHER SECURITIES IN THE BV AND NV
5.1. One Share One Vote and Multiple Voting Rights
The BCCA gives all companies, including the BV, the virtually
unlimited freedom to create new kinds of securities as long as the
characteristics of the securities do not conflict with mandatory legal
provisions. For the NV the modernization is limited to the intro-
duction of the multiple voting rights and the abolishment of the
restrictions on the issuance of non-voting shares. With regard to the
latter, there is no longer any mandatory compensation by means of
a preferential dividend and the number of cases in which non-
voting shares will have mandatory voting rights is limited.
Since the concept of capital in the BV disappeared and therefore no
longer have any relationship with the notion of capital, there remains
no link between the value of the contribution and the rights attached to
the shares. The rule that equal rights are attached to all shares is
therefore removed in the BV. Each share now gives the right to a
number of votes granted to this share in the articles of association. The
default rule, however, remains that each share has one vote and that
each share gives the right to an equal share in the profit and in the
settlement. Furthermore, the company must issue at least one share
and must have at least one share with a voting right, avoiding ‘share-
holderless’/‘no voting rights’ companies eroding the function of the
general meeting vis-à-vis the board. Otherwise, all forms of multiple
voting rights (without limitation in the number of votes) are possible,
preferential dividends are possible, and shares without voting rights do
not necessarily have to receive a preferential dividend. There is no
longer a need for the introduction of profit-sharing certificates in the
BV. The BV can create such securities, but can simply call them shares.
Although the principle remains that shares with equal value are
entitled to one vote, the articles of association can deviate from this
default rule. It is possible to issue shares with multiple voting rights.
Any multiple is possible as there were no abuses found for the
former cooperative companies, which allowed shares with multiple
voting rights. Instead of the traditional multiple voting right, shares
can also be given a veto right against certain types of decisions.
Many variations are conceivable.
However, in listed companies only double voting rights are
possible, and moreover only for those shares that belong to the same
shareholder without interruption for at least two years. These must
be fully paid-up registered shares. The introduction of the double
voting right requires an amendment of the articles of association.
This loyalty voting right is attached to the person of the shareholder
rather than to the shares. This system resembles the former French
system.16 The Belgian regime, however, is different from the current
French model, since the general meeting has the choice to amend
the articles of association (opt-in), while in a French listed company,
since 2014, the loyal shareholder automatically receives the double
voting right (unless the double voting right is excluded in the
articles of association; opt-out). The current empirical research does
not provide convincing evidence that deviations from the principle
of ‘one share, one vote’ are good or bad,17 but it seems rather
peculiar that the BCCA offers both the BV and unlisted NV many
options, also offers the listed NV the right to issue an unlimited
number of non-voting shares but provide in a limitation of double
voting rights for ‘loyal’ shareholders of listed companies.
5.2. Bonds and Subscription Rights
Belgium is familiar with a general meeting of bondholders.
Organizing bondholder meetings is still possible but the BCCA
15 K. Maresceau, Commentaar bij artikel 332 W.Venn, in Duiding Vennootschappen 2017, 367–371 (D. Bruloot, K. Byttebier, J. Cerfontaine, H. De Wulf & K. Maresceau eds,
Brussel: Larcier 2017).
16 C. Adline Herbain, Le droit de vote double comme instrument d’égalité des actionnaires, un paradoxe à la française, TRV-RPS 128 (2017).
17 See for an overview of the discussions, http://www.ecgi.org/osov/final_report.php.
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW JOURNAL APRIL 2020, VOLUME 17, ISSUE 231
offers room for alternatives. It allows for private negotiations out-
side this general meeting, and this meeting is not considered a body
of the company.18
The mandatory private nature of the BV disappeared and con-
sequently the BV can, just like the NV, issue convertible bonds and
bonds with a warrant or subscription right. Such warrants or sub-
scription rights can also be issued separately without being linked to
a bond. The former relevant rules are largely retained in the BCCA.
5.3. Issuance of New Shares
The issue of new shares remains a decision that must be taken by
the general meeting in accordance with the rules of the amendment
of the articles of association. However, the BCCA also makes it
possible for the BV to introduce a clause of ‘permitted capital’,
whereby the general meeting authorizes the board for a maximum
of five years to issue additional shares. In that case, the board is
bound by the limits established by the general meeting or by the
founders when the authorization has been given in the deed of
incorporation.
The former company law of the NV already contained the
requirement for directors to justify an issuance of the shares in a
report if this issuance takes place at the price below the capital value
of the existing shares. The report had to be disclosed (see Article 582
of the Companies Code). This procedure protected the incumbent
shareholders against the dilution of their stake. However, no similar
rule existed in case of an issuance at a price higher than the capital
value. For this reason, the BCCA introduces the obligation for both
the BV and the NV for the management body to draw up a report
for each issuance of new shares against new contributions. In
companies, which have elected a registered auditor, the latter must
report on whether the numbers in this management report are
‘reliable and sufficient to inform the general meeting voting on the
proposal’.
5.4. The Transfer of the Shares
Formerly, there existed very strict rules for transferring shares of a
BVBA, which could only be strengthened. The restrictions still exist
for the BV, but only as default rules. It is even envisaged that the BV
may list its shares on a stock market. In such a case, the BV can
issue dematerialized shares in order to ensure the smooth tradability
of the shares.
In the NV, the free transferability of shares is retained and the
regulation regarding contractual or statutory transfer restrictions
remained almost unchanged. From now on, conventional transfer
restrictions must be justified by a legitimate interest, and no longer
‘be justified in the interest of the company’. Inalienability of the
shares can be determined for an indefinite period but it can be
terminated at any time, subject to a reasonable notice period.
Furthermore, the transfer of the shares in breach of a statutory
transfer restrictions is not enforceable, neither against the company,
nor against third parties. This rule applies both in the BV and in the
NV and must protect the interests of the company and the
shareholders.
In the former BVBA it was highly controversial who has to pay
up when a share is transferred before it was fully paid. The BCCA
explains that when shares that are not fully paid up, are transferred,
both the transferor and the transferee are jointly and severally liable
to the company and third parties. In their internal relationship, the
rule applies that the transferor (seller) who is called to account for
the full payment can take recourse against the transferee (buyer),
unless otherwise agreed.
A register must be kept for each type of security at the registered
office of the company. This register must provide in more infor-
mation than formerly was the case. In addition to the details of the
shareholder’s identity, the deposits made and the transfers made, the
share register must from now on also state the statutory and con-
tractual transfer restrictions, as well as the voting rights and profit
rights attached to each share and their share in the settlement. This
reinforcement is motivated by the desire – in view of the increased
flexibility – to clearly inform (future) shareholders about the rights
attached to the shares and any applicable transfer restrictions. The
securities register can be kept in electronic form. The government
can thereby impose specific conditions as well as determine the
modalities of its storage and accessibility. It is unclear and rather
doubtful whether this offers the possibility of using modern tech-
nologies such as distributed ledgers (‘blockchain’) for keeping a
register and trading in different categories of securities. It is
recommended that the legal framework facilitates the use of a
distributed ledger and creates a framework like in France.19 This is
all the more important because the share register is gaining in
importance.20
6. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Attorneys-at-law must be aware of the new rules for dispute settle-
ment (forced exit and exclusion). This settlement regime applies to
both the BV and NV but the listed companies are excluded. The
framework must be distinguished from that for exiting the company
(see section 3.2.3). The dispute settlement regime requires a court
order and the price of the shares will be paid by the purchaser of the
shares, and not by the company.
In addition to a series of small, more technical improvements,
two major changes are particularly important. Firstly, the discussion
18 K. Maresceau & D. Roelens, De algemene vergadering van obligatiehouders, in De obligatielening 221–306 (D. Bruloot & K. Maresceau eds, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2017).
19 C. Van der Elst & A. Lafarre, Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 111–137 (2019).
20 Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill to introduce the Companies and Associations Code and containing various provisions, Parl. St. Kamer 2017–18, nr. 3119/1, 142.
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about the referential date is resolved.21 This referential date is the
date to be taken into account when valuing the shares to be trans-
ferred. According to the case law of the supreme court, the refer-
ential date must be as close as possible to the court ruling that
establishes the existence of a well-founded reason for the forced exit.
However, this approach has the important disadvantage that it does
not abstract of the circumstances that have arisen since the dispute
and had an impact on the value of the shares. Such an approach is
therefore often very disadvantageous for the exiting shareholder.
The BCCA ends this discussion by, on the one hand, maintaining
the starting point (valuation at the time of the judgment), but on the
other hand provide the court with the discretionary power to
increase or decrease the price if the valuation at the time of the
ruling provides in a manifestly unreasonable result.
The second major problem of the dispute settlement system to
which BCCA seeks to answer is related to the so-called related
claims. Under the old law, the court had no power to consider these
claims and, therefore, parallel proceedings had to be conducted.
This was not only inefficient, it was also one of the reasons why the
discussion regarding the referential date was bitter as the court
could not award any damages (for example, for abusive majority
behaviour) to the exiting shareholder in addition to the purchase
price of his shares. From now on, the BCCA states that the court
ruling may also settle all related claims, provided that these claims
relate to the financial relations between the parties and the company
or its affiliated companies. In addition, the court may also rule on
non-compete clauses that could bind the excluded shareholder
towards the company and can make part of the price dependent on
the acceptance of a non-compete obligation (or of stricter terms of
an existing clause).
7. THE BOARD OF THE BV AND NV
7.1. Appointment and Dismissal
The BCCA explicitly confirms the prerogative of the general meeting
for the appointment and the dismissal of the members of the gov-
erning body, as well as the conditions for the election and dismissal of
the directors. This provision is new but de facto confirms what
already was applied previously. As such, the general meeting decides,
among other things, on the remuneration to be paid to the members
of the board of directors (including the amount thereof), any insur-
ance contributions paid by the company (liability, pension accrual,
illness, accidents and death), the benefits in kind (transport, means of
communication), etc. These powers cannot be transferred to any
other company organ. Obviously, the general rule does not affect the
other specific provisions of the BCCA, like special rules on remu-
neration of directors for listed companies.
The scope of application of the aforementioned rule is limited to
the appointment and dismissal of the members of board of direc-
tors. Other special assignments that are entrusted to a director, like
the daily management and other executive management duties are
not envisaged. Based on the residual powers of the board, this board
determines the modalities under which these special assignments
are granted, exercised and terminated, except if the articles of
association of the company provide in other modalities.
The normal majority rules apply to the appointment and dis-
missal of non-statutory managers/directors, unless the articles of
association provide in a specific procedure. If the members of the
governing body have been appointed in the articles of association,
or if the articles of association contain special provisions regarding
the dismissal of those members, then these rules bind the general
meeting, unless a statutory majority can be achieved at the relevant
general meeting.
The BCCA overruled the public policy nature of the so called ad
nutum dismissal of directors of the NV. The ad nutum dismissal
remains the default arrangement, but the articles of association or
the contract with the director can provide differently. In this way, it
is possible to grant a director a termination term or provide in a
compensation scheme in case the general meeting dismisses the
director. This new regime also allows for a stronger, more credible
position of independent directors in companies with a majority
shareholder.
7.2. Internal Regulations
The BCCA contains a scheme for providing legal validity to the
so-called ‘internal regulations’ of the board. Such regulations
often establish the operating rules of the board of directors and
other corporate bodies and provide for general principles
regarding, inter alia, the delegation of powers. Those internal
regulations are valid, although with certain limits and some
conditions must be complied with. The articles of association
must empower the board for establishing those internal
regulations.22 Furthermore, the BCCA stipulates that the internal
regulations may not contain provisions (1) that are contrary to
the mandatory provisions of the BCCA or the articles of asso-
ciation, (2) on matters for which the BCCA requires a statutory
provision, and (3) on matters that touch on the rights of the
shareholders, the powers of the organs or the organization and
the functioning of the general meeting.
The internal rules cannot have external effect. Only if it can be
demonstrated that the third party was aware of the content of the
internal regulations, and therefore did not act in good faith, the
company can enforce the internal regulations against the third
party. In order to avoid any discussion in this regard, the
21 R. Tas & W. Van Gaver, De geschillenregeling: actuele highlights uit een evergreen, in Themis 89 (Vennootschaps- en financieel recht) 115–123 (Brugge, Die Keure 2014).
22 The articles of association can assign this power to the general meeting too.
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explanatory memorandum to the BCCA confirms that shareholders
cannot be considered as third parties.23
7.3. Governance Models
The governance models of the BV remained largely unaltered. The
BV can elect, just like the former BVBA, statutory or non-statutory
managers, from now on qualified as directors, who can either act
alone or act in college.
The BCCA offers more flexibility for governing the NV. One of
the major innovations for the NV concerns the introduction of the
governance arrangement with a sole director. This governance
model incorporates one of the essential characteristics of the part-
nership limited by shares (Comm.VA), a corporate form that is
abolished. As a result, BCCA offer three basic governance models
for the NV, namely: (1) the (pure) one-tier board, (2) the sole
director and (3) the (pure) two-tier board structure with a super-
visory board and a management board.
The one-tier board structure is the traditional governance
scheme in which the NV is managed by a board of directors that is
composed of at least three members. If, and as long as, the company
has less than three shareholders, the board of directors may consist,
just like today, of two directors. In the latter case, any provision
granting a decisive vote to a member of the board of directors loses
its effect. Some of the minor amendments of the BCCA is that a
membership of the board can be extended indefinitely and that a
board membership lasts until the ordinary general meeting in the
financial year in which it expires according to the appointment
decision. However, an important change is the abolishment of the
executive committee. If a company prefers a system within which an
important part of the board powers is delegated to a committee, it
has to revert to the two-tier board structure. It is in two different
ways different from the previous model: there is a prohibition to be
a member of both boards and the management board has exclusive
powers (cf. infra).
It should be noted that the prohibition to be a member of both
the supervisory board and the management board is not applicable
in case there is a lex specialis. One should mainly think of the
Banking Act and the Act on insurance and reinsurance undertak-
ings, which mandatorily provides that the members of the executive
board also serve on the board of directors.24
Each NV can opt for a sole directorship. The sole director can be
a natural person, but also a legal entity, in which case a permanent
representative must be designated (cf. supra section 2.2). There is
one exception to this freedom of choice for a natural person as sole
director. In listed companies and companies in which the law
requires a bipartite board (such as in financial institutions), that sole
director must be a public limited company, which itself has a board
of directors. In that case, the specific composition rules must be
applied at the level of the latter board of directors. Thus, among
other things, the gender quota and the committees required by law
for listed companies are applied at the level of the director-legal
entity.
The sole director may be appointed in the articles of association.
The articles of association may also provide for a successor for the
sole director. Although the system of the only director is based on
the management model of the (abolished) partnership limited by
shares (Comm.VA), an important difference exists. The sole direc-
tor can be, but does not have to be, unlimitedly responsible for the
commitments of the company. Practice has shown that the unlim-
ited liability of the sole director in the former partnership was all
too often symbolic, because the sole director could take the form of
a limited liability legal entity.
The sole director can be provided with extensive powers. The
articles of association may provide that the approval of the sole
director is required for every amendment to the articles of associa-
tion, for each distribution to the shareholders, or for her resigna-
tion. However, there is an important limitation. The general
meeting can always end the office of the sole director without her
approval, in accordance with the attendance and majority require-
ments for amending the articles of association, if there are legal
reasons for the dismissal. In addition, an instrument based on the
minority claim is also provided to minority shareholders who are
confronted with a sole director protected by the majority.
Shareholders with voting rights representing 10% of the capital or
3% in a listed company can appoint an ad hoc proxy who can
demand the dismissal of the sole director for legal reasons. This
specific shareholder right should provide in an equilibrium between
self-control and anchoring powers.
The NVs can also opt for a two-tier board structure with a
supervisory board and a management board. The supervisory board
is a collegial body composed of at least three members. The mem-
bers of the supervisory board may natural or legal persons but it is
not allowed to be a member of both boards of the same company.
The members of the supervisory board are appointed by the general
meeting. The supervisory board is exclusively competent for the
supervision of the management board, for the general policy and
strategy of the company, and for all matters that belong exclusively
to the board of directors in the one-tier board system, such as the
convening of the general meeting of shareholders and setting the
agenda of the meeting, the preparation of the annual report, the use
of the authorized capital, the purchase and sale of treasury shares
etc. The decision on the discharge of the members of the manage-
ment board is an exclusive power of the supervisory board, as well
as the power to file a corporate claim against the management
23 Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill to introduce the Companies and Associations Code and containing various provisions, Parl. St. Kamer 2017–18, nr. 3119/1, 75.
24 See more specifically Wet van 25 Apr. 2014 op het statuut en het toezicht op kredietinstellingen en beursvennootschappen, BS 7 mei 2014 en Wet van 13 maart 2016 op het
statuut van en het toezicht op de verzekerings- of herverzekeringsondernemingen, BS 23 maart 2016 (ed. 1), err. BS 8 Apr. 2016.
APRIL 2020, VOLUME 17, ISSUE 2 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW JOURNAL34
board. For the exercise of these exclusive powers, the supervisory
board also has external representation powers, and it can delegate
those powers to one or more of its members.
The management board is also a mandatory collegial body
composed of at least three members.25 The supervisory board
appoints the members of the management board. The former board
determines the remuneration of the management board. The special
rules regarding remuneration in listed companies also apply to the
members of the management board.
The management board is competent for all matters not reserved
to the supervisory board. The management board is therefore
exclusively competent for the operational functioning of the com-
pany and has the residual powers. If the company opts for a two-tier
board, the management board derives its powers from the law itself
and not from the transfer of powers nor of any delegation of
powers. Limitations of the powers of the management board in the
articles of association are in principle not enforceable against third
parties, unless the third party was aware of this limitation or, in light
of the circumstances, the third party could not have been unaware
of the limitation. The publication of the limitations in the articles of
association does not constitute sufficient proof of this knowledge.
In order to enable the supervisory board to perform its super-
visory duties properly, to estimate correctly its own liability and to
prepare the annual report, the BCCA provides for a mandatory flow
of information from the management board to the supervisory
board. The management board must provide, on a regular basis, the
necessary information to the supervisory board. The supervisory
board can also request information from the management board.
More specifically, the management board must report to the
supervisory board at least once a year of the general strategic policy,
the general and financial ratios and the management and control
systems of the company.26 The management board must also make
sure to provide the necessary information that the supervisory board
must include in the annual report in a timely manner.
The BCCA also provides in a day-to-day management function
that can be organized in a daily management board that can act
individually or as a college. Whilst formerly only available for the
NV, the BCCA provides this day-to-day management function also
for the BV. In a NV, it is either the board of directors in a one-tier
system or the management board in a two-tier system that appoints
the day-to-day management.
7.4. Conflicts of Interest
The BCCA maintains the conflicts of interest procedures of the
former Companies Code. However, there are a few changes. For
example, in the BV with a collegial administrative body, in the BV
with several competing directors and in the NV with a one-tier
board of directors, a director who is confronted with a proprietary
interest that conflicts with the interest of the company must abstain
from taking part in the deliberation as well as in the decision taking
process of the decision or transaction to which the conflict relates. If
all members of the board experience a conflict of interest, the
general meeting must approve the decision or transaction. The latter
procedure is also applicable in case the BV or NV is governed by a
sole director.
In a company with a two-tier board, a conflict of interest at the
level of the management board results in the transfer of the decision
to the supervisory board. If a member of the supervisory board, in
turn, experience a conflict of interest the board member should
abstain from taking part in the deliberation as well as in the decision
taking process of the decision or transaction to which the conflict
relates. If all the members of the supervisory board have a conflict of
interest, the decision or transaction is scheduled as an agenda item
of the general meeting for approval. The decision of the general
meeting must be taken before the transaction can be executed.
Another novelty is that any interested party can start a procedure
to annul the decision that has been taken if the conflict of interest
procedure has not been appropriately applied. Formerly this
annulment procedure could only be started by the company itself,
which was unlikely to happen.
8. DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION
Book 2 of the BCCA bundles the procedures that are applicable in
case of the voluntary dissolution, the dissolution as a result of a fact
or event described by the code of companies, and the judicial
dissolution of companies. Those procedures are largely similar to
the procedures in the former Companies Code. The amendments
are related to clarifications or uncertainties that previously existed.
With regard to the liquidation of companies, three changes
should be mentioned:
– A first important change concerns the judicial homologation of
the appointment of the liquidator and the approval by the court
of the distribution plan. These judicial interventions, which
often cause delays, are only maintained for liquidations that
show deficiencies. This is justified because there is only a risk of
creditors being disadvantaged in the event of a deficit
settlement.
– The second major change is that the process of dissolution and
liquidation in one deed is also open to companies of which not
all the debts of third parties have been reimbursed, nor have the
necessary funds been consigned. The application of this proce-
dure requires that the unpaid creditors (including shareholders,
if any) have confirmed that they agree with the application of
25 The question arises as to why in a one-tier board structured NV one director is sufficient, while a NV with a two-tier board, each board must be composed of at least three
directors.
26 Comparable to Book 2:141 Dutch Civil Code.
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this procedure. The registered auditor or external accountant
must refer to the written consent of the creditors in the con-
clusions of her report on the closure of the liquidation.
– The third change concerns the introduction of a specific kind of
shareholder liability with regard to the ‘forgotten liability’. To
the extent that shareholders have received any consideration
from the liquidation of the company, they are liable for unpaid
corporate debts up to this consideration. In an ordinary liqui-
dation procedure, this liability only exists for unpaid corporate
debts for which a sufficient amount has not been consigned, if
the shareholders were actually aware (subjective bad faith) or
should have known (objective bad faith) of the existence of such
debts. In case the dissolution and liquidation takes place in one
deed, the criterion of bad faith is not applicable. This increased
liability is justified because the dissolution and liquidation in
one deed offers fewer guarantees to the company creditors. The
liability of the shareholders of the BV and the NV is limited to
the net asset the shareholders received. A similar system is
provided for assets that emerge afterwards (so-called ‘forgotten
asset’). In that case, the unpaid creditors are granted the right to
claim the reopening of the liquidation. In order to prevent the
creditors from having to involve each of the shareholders in the
proceedings, the BCCA stipulates that upon reopening of the
liquidation, the company may regain, if necessary, legal person-
ality and it becomes the legal owner of the forgotten asset.
9. ENTRY INTO FORCE AND CONCLUSION
The BCCA entered into force on 1 May 2019 for newly established
companies. For companies that have been established prior to 1
May 2019 the BCCA applies since 1 January 2020. If the articles of
association are in conflict with the mandatory provisions of the
BCCA, they are considered unwritten. Companies have until 1
January 2024 to adjust the articles of association. However, the legal
obligation to bring the articles of association in line with the BCCA
emerges as soon as any amendment of the articles of association is
scheduled. The new rules regarding the dispute settlement took
immediate effect as of 1 May 2019.
The abolished forms of companies are provided with a transition
period of five years to convert. As long as this has not been done,
they will continue to be governed by the old Companies Code, with
the exception, however, that the mandatory provisions from the
BCCA, which relate to the legal form that best corresponds to the
abolished form, must be applied. After this transition period, the
company is legally converted into a surviving legal form determined
by the BCCA and the company must bring its articles of association
in accordance with the requirements of the particular legal form
within six months of that date. The governing body is responsible
for taking the necessary steps.
The BCCA significantly reforms Belgian company and association
law. The reform was vital. After all, many Belgian rules lagged con-
siderably behind those in neighbouring countries. The new legislation
looks modern and the first data indicate that this leads to an increase
in the number of companies being established, and founders imme-
diately make use of the flexibility that the BV is offering.27 However,
the reform comes with considerable costs as many thousands of
companies have to convert in a new company type and almost all
companies must amend the articles of association. Further, due to the
premature resignation of the government, the legislative process had
to speed up the reform process, lowering the quality of some parts of
the BCCA. Consequently, a new law amending many articles of the
BCCA is currently being debated in Parliament.28
27 See for an overview C. Van der Elst, De invloed van het nieuwe wetboek van vennootschappen en verenigingen op het vermogen, de aandelenstructuur en de aandelenoverdracht
van BV’s: een empirisch onderzoek, TRV/RPS 2020, in press.
28 See Bill transposing Directive (EU) 2017/828 and regarding rules for companies and associations, Parl. St. Kamer 2019–20, nr. 553/1, 475 p.
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